

Editor's Note: English translation of Chapter 6 of *Mater Dolorosa*

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The Origins of the Nation

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PART III.

CONSERVATIVE OPINION: BETWEEN RELIGION AND THE NATION

CHAPTER 6

CATHOLICISM AND *ESPAÑOLISMO*: FROM THE *ANTIGUO RÉGIMEN* TO FERNANDO VII

The shouts and cheers of those that rose up against the French during the summer of 1808 did not acclaim the Spanish nation but the king, Fernando VII, and, above all, Catholicism. Fray Simón López recalls that “the cry of the nation [...] resounded everywhere”, but adds that it was a cry of “long live Religion, long live the Church, long live the Virgin, long live God, long live Fernando VII, death to Napoleon, death to the French”. This rousing exclamation would be heard later with only slight variations: “Long live Fernando VII, long live Religion, long live the Catholic Church and death to the impious Napoleon with all his satellites and his anti-Christian, tolerant, schismatic France”. The nation ceded pride of place to the king and, in particular, to collective religious beliefs and the ecclesiastical institutions that embodied them. As Fray Manuel Amado noted, “We did not do it for our *patria*; we acted as we did because our religion demanded that we act in that way.”¹

All observers, including the French generals and even the Emperor himself (who classed the whole episode as a “revolt of friars”), agreed that the Catholic clergy played a leading role in the anti-Napoleonic mobilisation. And there can be no doubt that for the majority of the insurgents their sense of civic duty in fighting the

invader was rooted in Catholic doctrine. Amongst the heroes and symbols invoked during the war, Saint James the Apostle and local patron saints such as the Virgin of Covadonga in Asturias, the Virgin of Fuencisla in Segovia, or the Virgin of the Pilar in Zaragoza figured far more often than legendary warriors such as Don Pelayo, El Cid or Hernán Cortes. Even references to the *patria* were usually qualified by the addition of “its ancient customs” or “its holy traditions”, among which the Catholic religion always came first. In the minds of the majority, Spain and Catholicism were one and the same thing.²

The identification between Spain and Catholicism was destined to continue for a long time, certainly well into the 1850s. The most striking aspect is that it survived, if not in opposition to, then at least relatively *detached from*, the national myth, which, during the early decades of the Modern Age, was created and controlled by the liberals. This was because the idea of nationhood embodied a secular, autonomous vision of the State that was a far from welcome thought to the men of the church, who included in their ranks almost all of the ideologues of Hispanic conservatism. Only as the century advanced did doctrinal shifts within conservatism allow it to shape national myths. The aim of this chapter is to describe the manner by which conservative circles, defined far more by their religiosity than by their identification with the State, gradually evolved towards a nationalist outlook. The first section looks at how closely Catholicism was identified with the Hispanic monarchy at the time of the Counter-Reformation. The second section examines the purges of the non-Catholic minorities in Iberian society in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, something which left a lasting imprint upon the way in which the dominant religiosity was understood. The third section analyses the significance of the celebrated “alliance between the Altar and the Throne” in the final years of the *antiguorégimen*, an alliance that was never free of rivalry. Only then can one fully appreciate the complexity of the ties that bound Spanish identity to Catholicism at the beginning of the Modern Age and the subsequent role of religion in the great political upheavals of the nineteenth century.

SPAIN AND THE LIGHT OF TRENT

Menéndez Pelayo famously declared that Spain was “the light of Trent”. Not only was the Hispanic monarchy of the Hapsburgs at the forefront of the fight against Lutheranism, it was also the theologians and canon lawyers of Salamanca and Alcalá de Henares who did most to elaborate a Catholic refutation of Luther’s doctrines. After the first hundred years of the Early Modern Age, it was universally agreed that both the Hapsburg monarchy and its subjects were identified with the Holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic version of Christianity. Catholicism was not embodied in any particular king or dynastic house but in “Spain”. Consequently the Counter-Reformation played a crucial role in determining collective identity within the Spanish monarchy, while in other countries this fell to the Protestant Reformation.

Benedict Anderson argues that in order for an identity to have been created in Spain that was similar to that of the Protestant countries it would have been necessary for the Church to encourage bible reading, thereby increasing both publications and literacy. As it was, the clergy did everything within its power to keep the people apart from theological discussions of any sort (including the more literate urban middle classes), and it never embarked upon nor tolerated the intense pamphleteering and propaganda that characterized Protestantism.³ Counter-Reformist Catholicism had its own methods for transmitting its ideas without the need for reading. It used a variety of instruments for shaping beliefs, attitudes and behaviour that included the weekly sermon, sporadic missionary campaigns and the purging of heretics. These constituted the Catholic church's fundamental means of communication with an illiterate population. The church also encouraged certain cultural activities such as theatrical performances, which could be highly creative and through which ideological messages, such as those contained in the great mystery plays or the works of Calderón de la Barca and Lope de Vega, could reach the general public. Last, but not least, the church had its own methods of dissuasion, primarily the Tribunal of the Holy Office - otherwise known as the Inquisition - which exercised a rigid control over the faithful, persecuted ethnic minorities and punished unorthodox behaviour. The Inquisition also had its own means of discrimination, in the form of the *estatutos de limpieza de sangre* or Statutes of Pure Blood.

The kind of identity fostered by the Counter-Reformation Church was therefore different to that of the northern Protestant Churches as a result of the differing channels of religious transmission. Instead of the silence and restraint of Lutheran pietism, the result of an inner vision of religiosity based upon direct communication with the divine and the personal responsibility of the believer, Catholicism encouraged the worship of sacred objects and places and the celebration of public acts and ceremonies through which God was revealed and his message explained. The sacraments were especially important: these outward, material acts had great spiritual significance because they altered the state of grace of the participants, and Spanish Catholicism took to such public acts and the worship of material objects like none other. The objects were naturally holy images for which Christians felt a special devotion; a *collective* devotion, it should be added, as the saints, the christs and the virgins were peculiar to each region or city, neighbourhood or craft. Even when these images were small enough to be carried about the body or on clothes as an amulet or as a means of protection, in the form of medals, rosaries or scapularies, they were often worn in order to be visible, to be seen *publicly*. Even more important than the veneration of objects was the participation of individuals in ceremonies that were clearly both public and collective: as well as Sunday Mass, there were the fundamental rites of passage which the Church had converted into sacraments, including a Catholic baptism, marriage and burial. Also of particular importance were the processions, acts consistent with the occupation of specifically public spaces through which the faithful would parade and display the religious symbols of their community. Generally, these took place only on fixed dates during the year, such as Holy Week, but could also be improvised in moments of exceptional need, such as droughts or

epidemics. Wearing a medal, attending Mass, taking the sacraments and, above all, forming part of a brotherhood and carrying on one's own shoulders a sumptuous baroque *paso* through the streets, all identified the participant as a member of a community.

This was not so much a *religion* as a *culture*. A culture which was typical of all Catholic Europe, and which, in contrast to Protestant culture, did not consist of a set of profound personal convictions nor of an intellectual comprehension of certain dogmas or beliefs. These differences, however, did not prevent the formation of equally powerful collective identities. In order to be a Catholic, it was not necessary - or even advisable, as one could easily be treading on dangerous ground - to be able to read or to uphold an orthodox, dogmatic interpretation of the faith. Indeed, the Tridentine catechism recommended that, when faced with the slightest theological doubt, one should respond, "Holy Mother Church has doctors who will know how to answer you". Crucial to an understanding of Spanish Catholicism in the Early Modern Age was participation in the same acts as one's neighbours, thus demonstrating a public and unequivocal submission to the authority and dictates of the Roman Catholic Church as the exclusive exponent of the sacred message. Such complete acceptance of the Catholic church as the unique interpreter of the revealed truth also implied acceptance of its social privileges. These were so great because, as the church's earthly representatives explained, nothing was ever enough to "honour God".⁴

Given that visible and public activities were encouraged in order to make explicit the submission of believers to the Church, the kind of religious behaviour that resulted was noisy and festive - even in the celebration of dramatic events - and deeply rooted in paganism. All in all, it was radically different from the silent communication of the Lutheran with God. Although there was no connection with the Bible or with the printed word, which, according to Anderson, were the cornerstones of collective identity in the Protestant world, the Catholic identity was none the less as intense and socially influential as the Protestant one.

ETHNIC CLEANSING. THE VAIN ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE UNIFORMITY

At first glance, the identification of Spain with Catholicism would appear to be as immutable and incontrovertible as any natural, geographical feature. In reality, this is far from the truth. Contemporary Spanish society has shown this by its spectacular social and cultural transformation over the last fifty years, although one does not need to turn to the present. Just a hundred years before the time of Felipe II, in the second half of the fifteenth century, the Iberian Peninsula was a mosaic of cultures, which Christian Europe contemplated with incomprehension and distrust precisely because of its variegated identity.

Throughout the whole of the Middle Ages, Muslims and Christians had shared an existence in Hispania that comprehended many more years of peace than of war, while the Jews occupied the gaps between Christendom and Islam in order to enjoy

a degree of tolerance that they were unable to find elsewhere. Nevertheless, coexistence and tolerance should not be equated with an absence of tension. Persecution of the Jews had been known since the time of the Visigoths. It had also taken place in Muslim territory at the height of Almoravid and Almohad fanaticism, a period during which many Jews had taken refuge in Christian lands, but towards the end of the 14th century a renewed spirit of persecution flourished there, too. The massacres began in 1391 following a virulently anti-Semitic campaign by an Archdeacon of Ecija. They erupted again in 1412 in the wake of the zealous mission of Fray Vicente Ferrer, and reached a peak in the mid-15th century in Toledo and other cities of Castile and Andalusia. In addition to these *pogroms*, discriminatory measures were adopted by the *Cortes*, such as the obligation of wearing special badges and the ban on carrying arms, dressing in fine fabrics or holding certain public offices. The Jewish population responded with mass baptisms, which generated a new problem in the form of the *conversos*, or converted. There were 200,000 to 250,000 “*conversos*” or “*marranos*” at the start of the reign of the Catholic Kings, comprising some 4% or 5% of the total population, but their conversion did not make them any more acceptable to “old Christians”. It is true that, in many cases, the sincerity of their faith was more than suspect, but some embraced their new beliefs with unquestionable authenticity and yet were no better received.⁵

The conversions did not prevent the Peninsula from continuing to be a land that exhibited a degree of multiculturalism that shocked visitors from beyond the Pyrenees, where Muslims were unknown and the Jews had been expelled centuries before. The tales told by travellers, ambassadors and pilgrims show how they judged the civilisation and religiosity of the Peninsular kingdoms according to the common criteria of the age, that is, by the fertility of the soil, the courtesy of the inhabitants, and the relics and buildings devoted to worship within each region. Among Hispanic “abnormalities”, no informant failed to record with indignation the presence of numerous Moorish and Jewish subjects in kingdoms that claimed to be Christian. Gabriel Tetzl, an aristocrat from Nüremberg travelling in Castile and Aragon as part of the retinue of the Bohemian nobleman, León de Rosmihal, between 1465-67, described the country as full of Jews and Muslims and, according to him, there were traces of the orient even in the customs and features of Christian subjects. As he journeyed through the lands of the Conde de Haro, he was scared to be among so many “murderous and wicked” people and observed with astonishment that the Count “allows them all [Muslims and Jews] to live in peace.” “They say that the Count is Christian”, he concluded, but “no-one knows the religion that he professes”. Twenty years later, the Germano-Polish nobleman, Niklas Poplau or Nicholas de Popielovo, noted that “throughout Aragon live Saracens, whom we Germans call rats” and he complained openly of royal tolerance, calling Queen Isabella herself a “protector of Jews”.⁶

Foreign repugnance at the “impurity” of the Peninsula’s subjects could not but have influenced the Catholic Kings when they began to play a central role in European politics. Under heavy pressure from strongly anti-Semitic opinion at home, they considered that the time had come to dispense with religious and racial diversity.

In so doing, they were seeking to achieve a dual objective: the most obvious one, which is always stressed by observers, was to reinforce the unity of the social body and avoid any kind of religious dissidence, which was presumed to be dangerous for the stability of the kingdoms. The other objective, which was doubtless of lesser importance but should not be underrated, was to make the breakthrough into Europe, to make Spaniards acceptable to the rest of Christendom. In 1478, Ferdinand and Isabella obtained papal permission to set up the Inquisition, whose initial purpose was to ensure the purity of faith among the *conversos*. The first actions of the tribunal were harsh in the extreme: although the numbers of the “released” - a euphemism for those condemned to die at the stake - and of those otherwise found guilty continue to be the subject of debate, it is at least clear that under the first three inquisitors, Torquemada, Deza and Cisneros, the Inquisition claimed more victims than in the subsequent three centuries of existence. These Inquisitors chose to take exemplary action, whose purpose was not only to punish those guilty of crypto-Judaism, but also to terrify those tempted to turn back to their old religion. There is no other way of interpreting the burning in effigy of fugitives, which was the response to the exodus of *conversos*.⁷

As the jurisdiction of the Inquisition did not extend to practising Jews and Muslims, the Catholic Kings eventually decided to take action against them as well. On 31 March 1492, flushed with the success of their recent occupation of Granada, the Kings decreed the expulsion of all Jews from their dominions. Experts have long debated the numbers of people affected by this measure, but the most reasonable estimate is that some 150,000 left the country whilst about half that number opted for conversion. This created a vacuum in fields such as medicine, finance, royal administration and certain crafts which the Christian population was unable to fill, although it is true that the activities of the *conversos* partially compensated for the flight of expertise and also contributed to the great cultural flowering that took place in the following decades. From *converso* families came literary figures such as Fernando de Rojas, humanists such as Juan Luis Vives, and, above all, mystics and religious reformers, including Luis de León, Ignacio de Loyola, Teresa de Jesús and Juan de Avila, amongst many others. Great administrators such as Santángel de la Caballería and Antonio Pérez, and doctors such as Andrés Laguna, were also *conversos*. They were all sincere Christians, although there were others whose conversions were undertaken merely for appearance's sake. What is important is that all of them fell within the jurisdiction of the Holy Office because they had been baptised.⁸

As for the Muslims, a protracted error has crept into Spanish histories, which persist in referring to the *taking* or *conquest* of Granada. Properly speaking, this never happened. Granada was not conquered, but agreed on its *conditionalsurrender* following a lengthy siege. The *capitulaciones*, or terms of surrender, guaranteed its inhabitants the free practice of their language and religion, as well as the continuity of their traditional judges. These clauses were respected for the first ten years, the period in which Hernando de Talavera, who had been appointed Archbishop of the new diocese, attempted the conversion of Muslims by peaceful means and even made the effort to learn their language. Once

he had passed away, and in view of the slowness of the conversion process, the king and queen appointed Cisneros in his place. The latter introduced compulsory baptisms, which caused the first, harshly-repressed revolts in the Albaicín neighbourhood of Granada. Reneging on the promises signed only ten years earlier, a royal decree of 1502 obliged all Muslims to choose between baptism or exile. Although this brought the Muslim problem to an abrupt end, just as it had the Jewish question before, it created the *morisco* minority in the same way as the same measure had earlier created the *converso* minority.⁹

Coming from northern Europe, where prejudice against the non-Christian subjects of the Peninsular kingdoms was so strong, Carlos V was even less tolerant than the Catholic Kings. It is curious to note that Carlos' sentiments coincided with those of the peoples of Castile and Valencia, who were otherwise in rebellion against him. In 1520, members of the *Germanía* or brotherhood in Valencia forced the Muslims to be baptised under pain of death. It must have been the only issue on which the Emperor agreed with the Valencian rebels because five years later he ratified the measure, placing Valencian Muslims in the same dilemma as those of Granada in 1502 in having to choose between conversion or exile. A guarantee was given to those who opted for baptism: they would remain free from inquisitorial investigation for forty years, which seemed to be a promise of leniency with regard to false conversions. However, Pope Clement VII undertook to absolve the king from fulfillment of the oath and by the end of Carlos' reign the Inquisition was taking action against the *moriscos* as freely as it did against the Jewish *conversos*. In 1526, the year in which Carlos V moved with his Erasmian court to Granada and began to build his magnificent Italianate circular palace in the heart of the Alhambra, he decided for the first time upon radical acculturation. He brought the Inquisition to the city and forbade the use of the Arabic language or Arabic dress. These measures led to so much conflict that the authorities were forced to suspend them. Forty years later, his son, Felipe II, had them reinstated, which led to a great uprising in the Alpujarras mountains. On this occasion, it was decided to use force. Two armies, one of them under the command of Juan de Austria, were ordered to either kill the *moriscos* in the mountains of Granada or else scatter them throughout Spain.¹⁰

Pockets of resistance continued to exist, particularly in the kingdom of Valencia where the majority of the *morisco* population lived, until the end of the century, a period overshadowed by the Turkish threat along the Mediterranean coast. Given that the *moriscos* were regarded as a potential bridgehead for an Ottoman landing, it is not surprising that it was then that the idea of expelling them from the dominions of the Catholic monarchy began to take shape. In Valencia, where the *moriscos* made up 20% of the population and it was feared that their expulsion would have a dramatic effect on the economy, the Archbishop none the less declared that the *moriscos*, far from being useful, were "sponging off the wealth of Spain"; others, in Castile, warned that the industry and fertility of the *morisco* families that had been driven from the Alpujarras would convert them into the dominant race of the kingdom. Finally, between 1609 and 1614, Felipe III signed a series of decrees for the expulsion of the *moriscos*. Between 250,000 and

300,000 people departed the various Peninsular kingdoms for Tangiers, Tetuan, Oran or Tunis.¹¹ Some, who had become true Christians, resisted the forced deportations and voluntarily suffered the death penalty. “We cry for Spain”, says the *morisco* Ricote in Don Quixote, “when all is said and done, we were born there and it is our natural home”. But other, less compassionate authors than Cervantes, rejoiced in the expulsion of the *moriscos*, “enemies within of unconquered Catholic Spain”, as “the most honourable, excellent and heroic enterprise that any prince in the world has attempted”; “once again Spain belonged entirely to those who were her children and these infidels returned to the lands of Africa from whence they had come”.¹² The old Hispania had finally been cleansed of the alleged ethnic impurities which had besmirched it during the Middle Ages.

With the expulsion of the *moriscos*, the non-Catholic minorities had all but disappeared from the Peninsula. There remained the *conversos*, or New Christians of Jewish descent, who, following a century and a quarter of Inquisitorial action, had been carefully vetted, as well as those *moriscos* scattered across the different kingdoms who had managed to pass undetected. Isolated from one another and anxious to cover their tracks, in a few generations these peoples had lost all memory of the religions of their forebears. By that time, however, religion had ceased to be the issue: expulsion had simply turned into racial cleansing, whereby all descendants of the old minorities were denied any position of respectability within Christian society. A new legal instrument called the *Estatutos de limpieza de sangre* was employed for this purpose, having been invented in the fifteenth century in order to deny *conversos* access to certain professions; religious orders, university colleges and even entire provinces, such as Guipúzcoa. At the time, the *Estatutos* had provoked a bitter debate, even leading to a conciliatory papal intervention to the effect that the *conversos* were no longer Jews and that all Christians, new or old, were worthy of the same respect. Unfortunately, a later Pope was prepared to sanction such measures, in this case Paul III. The popularity of the *Estatutos* spread during the reign of Carlos V, when they were adopted by the *cabildos*, or city councils, of Seville, Cordoba and Toledo, as well as by the universities of Salamanca and Valladolid and the Franciscan Order. They did not punish new Christians outright; the mechanism was actually more perverse in that it reversed the burden of proof and obliged the applicant for a post or pension to demonstrate their condition as an “old Christian”, this requiring evidence of four or five generations of baptism, the maximum that the archives of the time could provide. It seemed impossible to eradicate one’s non-Christian past. As one fifteenth century poet put it, with bitter humour:

“...Ollas de tocino asado / torreznos a medio asar,
oir misas y rezar, / santiguar y persignar
y nunca pude borrar / este rastro de confeso”.¹³

In 1547, a serious row erupted between the Archbishop of Toledo and the new and vigorous Society of Jesus, who refused to introduce an *Estatuto*, the reason being that some of its founders, including Loyola and Lainez, had been born into *converso* families. Academic debate continued for decades, as did the indecision of the Spanish government, which led Felipe II to forbid the application of the

Estatutos for a brief period. By the end of Felipe's reign, however, the *Estatutos* had become widespread, and even the Society of Jesus was obliged to demand that its novices possess "pure blood", whilst it rewrote the biographies of its founders to eliminate any reference to their *impure* racial origins.¹⁴

By the end of the 16th century, the integration of the descendants of *conversos* and *moriscos* into Spanish society was almost complete. The majority had lost any memory of their past. A few new Christian families managed, after manipulating or faking documents, buying up land and adopting an aristocratic lifestyle, to acquire titles, including that of Grandee of Spain, and to occupy high-ranking ecclesiastical posts. As Américo Castro above all has stressed, many of the writers of the *Siglo de Oro*, even those who constantly referred to those of Jewish or Moorish blood with contempt, were descended from *conversos*. Who knows how many Spaniards today, even amongst the ardent defenders of racial pride and National-Catholicism, do not also descend from such families.¹⁵

The identification of Spain with fanatical Catholicism led to her becoming an indelible part of the so-called *Leyenda Negra*. There was certainly some justification for this, but it does not cease to be a legend or at least a distortion of reality; by no means could all the inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula be considered supporters of either absolutism or Catholic intransigence. Such an attitude was neither unanimous nor did it bear any relation to an innate collective psychological trait. On the contrary, in the Peninsular kingdoms of around 1500 there existed at one and the same time a rich and diverse cultural world, and a sensual, secular Renaissance, with groups of the followers of Erasmus as numerous as in the most cultured societies of Christendom. The same period saw the development of mystic tendencies, whose advocates practised an inner Christian spirituality akin to Lutheranism and supported reform of the regular clergy; a reform which was carried out, to a large extent, at the end of the 15th century and which partially explains the later failure of Protestantism to take hold in Spain. Even so, there were communities of Protestants in Valladolid and Seville, as indeed there were groups of Illuminists. Economic and political structures were modern and dynamic, and criticism of monarchist policy led to rebellious movements such as the *Comunidades* of Castile, which were very advanced in comparison with Europe. The triumph of the absolute monarchy, the Inquisition and the *Estatutos* was the result of an internal struggle that ended in victory for the most conservative sectors of the Catholic hierarchy. By imposing their version of the *imagined community* on Spain, it became necessary to "purify" society of Jews, *moriscos* and Protestants. It is true that these sectors had previously caused certain problems but these only became insurmountable once the time came to build a national stereotype based on a homogeneous culture. Only then did anyone begin to think that other races, although they lived in 'Spain', did not form part of 'Spain'; at which point, their elimination became inevitable.

With regard to Spain's foreign relations, it is important to note how the attempt to impose Christian cultural uniformity was also an effort to overcome her perceived eccentricity with respect to Europe. The purification process had originally been

incited and encouraged by the rest of Christendom, and the expulsion decreed by the Catholic Kings brought them felicitations from the Pope and other Christian rulers. Hieronymus Münzer, a German noble who journeyed through the Peninsula in the late 15th century, recorded with evident satisfaction the demolition of the Jewish quarter in Granada and praised the king and queen for condemning false converts and renegade Christians to death. He encouraged them to do the same with the Saracens, even while admitting that they were excellent subjects. Shortly afterwards, in 1513, the Florentine ambassador and great political thinker, Francesco Guicciardini, noted that when the Catholic Kings had come to the throne “the whole kingdom was full of Jews and heretics and the majority of people were tainted with this *infection*.”¹⁶ Nevertheless, foreign mistrust did not end with the expulsion. The troops of Carlos V who sacked Rome were greeted with cries of “*marranos*”, as Sverker Arnoldsson pointed out some years ago. Erasmus of Rotterdam refused the invitation of Cardinal Cisneros to visit Spain; *non placet Hispania*, he wrote privately on one occasion, and, although his motives are not known, Marcel Bataillon speculates that it was due to the secret anti-Semitism of this prince of humanists. Years before, in a letter in which he had advised a student to abandon his study of the Talmud and other “foolishness”, Erasmus wrote, “in Spain there are scarcely any Christians”. In the mid 16th century, Pope Paul IV voiced his low opinion of the Spanish, on account of their *tainted* blood, and even at the beginning of the 17th century Cardinal Richelieu was to opine that the Spanish were “*des marranes, des faux catholiques, des basanés*”. The Russians of the sixteenth century must have believed something similar as, without ever having visited the Peninsula, they called their inhabitants *Iverianin*, Iberians, a word which they confused with *Evreianin*, Hebrews. Alain Milhou observes that, “as if it were a mirror image, Europe saw her new masters, the Spanish, as new Christians, while in the Peninsula [new Christians] were objects of suspicion in the eyes of the majority of old Christians”.¹⁷

The situation became greatly aggravated because the purification [OJO: or purging?] of the Jews and Moriscos coincided with the accession of the Catholic monarchy to European political hegemony. The testimonies that crossed the Pyrenees about the brutalities of the purification process, crystallized in the umbrella term “Spanish Inquisition”, became the argument for creating an image of Hispanic society based on intolerance and cruelty. Later on, the country’s backwardness and its inability to adapt to modernity would also be blamed on its fanatical spirit. It is ironic that in the origins of that intolerance lay the attempt to become more modern (but in the worst possible sense) by creating a homogeneous, white, Christian society that would be acceptable to the rest of Europe. In order to demonstrate to Christendom that Spain formed a part of it, she had resorted to a “modern” solution that would thrive in the nationalistic twentieth century: the cultural homogenisation of a country by the forcible elimination of its minorities. It was one of the first examples of “ethnic cleansing” in modern Europe. As in all cases, it caused untold suffering and, to some extent, produced the opposite effect to that desired because it marked the Spanish stereotype with overtones of a very un-European brutality and primitivism.

The problem of Protestantism in Spain was slightly different to that of the non-Christian minorities because this was not a preexisting ethnic group but a cultural phenomenon related to the new cultural 'climate' of the Renaissance. However, the criteria upon which a solution to the Protestant problem was based remained the same: a fear of internal division. The conviction that *unity of belief* is necessary for the stability of the social body became an obsession that, in spite of the radical changes in circumstances, was to survive as a political myth up to at least the end of the nineteenth century. In the *Siglo de Oro*, the immense majority of intellectuals, even those who were highly critical of the censorship exercised by the Inquisition over artistic creativity and scientific progress, regarded the religious unity enjoyed under the Spanish monarchy from the start of the sixteenth century as profoundly positive. To some extent, this is understandable as religious differences had plunged many countries north of the Pyrenees – including their powerful neighbour and rival, France – into a serious and lengthy crisis, which would prove to be an essential factor in maintaining the hegemony of the Spanish Hapsburgs.

In conclusion, a series of events led to the creation of a cultural identity among the subjects of the Spanish monarchy based upon the Catholicism of the Counter-Reformation. A largely common system of values had been internalised by the majority of that society's members and, as a result, they also shared a xenophobic distrust, if not a visceral hatred, of the heretics of northern Europe. This was added to their traditional enmity towards Muslims and the deep-rooted anti-Semitism that has survived to the present day in terms such as "*judiada*" (dirty trick) and "*marrano*" (filthy pig). To their many and varied geographical, professional, class and family identities (though not their political ones, which remain speculative for this era), all of these people would have added that of "Christian", or, possibly "Catholic", or, to be more exact, "Holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic", and, given half a chance, "old Christian" or "of pure blood". Words that would probably be spoken either with far greater pride or a far greater degree of anxiety (given the need for acceptance), than any other identifying reference.

THE ALTAR AND THE THRONE: A NOT ALTOGETHER HAPPY MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE

During the early modern age and a large part of the modern one, the "Spanish Church" was an organisation *sui generis*, with its loyalties divided between universal Catholicism, on the one hand, and the Hispanic Monarchy, on the other. In more graphic terms, it was obliged to serve two masters: it submitted to papal precepts on all dogmatic and liturgical issues without the least hesitation, but it was subject to the Spanish monarch in all aspects of daily life and it was he, in particular, who possessed the right of "*patronato*" or presentation of the men who would hold the bishoprics and all other ecclesiastical positions of any importance. This privilege had been granted by the Pope to the Catholic Kings after the conquest of Granada, although it had only pertained to posts in the old Muslim kingdom. The Kings skilfully manoeuvred to extend this right to include the whole of the New World when its conquest and evangelisation began. Their successors,

Carlos V (after elevating his former tutor, Adrian of Utrecht, to the Papal See) and Felipe II (when he introduced the reforms decreed by the Council of Trent), then succeeded in further extending royal patronage to ecclesiastical positions throughout all the kingdoms of the monarchy. However, the *Rey Prudente*, not content with exercising control over these appointments, decided to arrogate to himself the right to grant the *paseregio*, or permission, for papal bulls and other pontifical documents to be published within his domains, as well as *recursos de fuerza*, procedural appeals that allowed civil tribunals to revise ecclesiastical decisions.

The Church was also subject to constant pressure to increase its financial contribution to the formidable expenses of the Crown. It is true to say that the bishoprics and abbeys were by far the wealthiest members of society, and that they were exempt from state taxes. However, by requiring them to divert a considerable portion of their revenues to the State, they became indirect tax collectors for the civil administration. In more than one sense, therefore, the Church became another branch of monarchical bureaucracy. It was a case of *regalism avant la lettre*, which led to extremely serious conflicts between *Catholic* monarchs and successive Vicars of Christ whom, in theory, they defended more keenly than anyone else. These conflicts led to open war with the Papacy, to the execution by royal order of papal envoys, and to other tensions so violent that they almost led to the excommunication of such very Catholic monarchs as Felipe II and Felipe IV.¹⁸

By no means did the relationship between Church and State lead to such intimate union that one could talk of a *theocracy* in imperial Spain, although it is true that in the theatrical works of the *Siglo de Oro* the monarch was practically deified, possibly to make the supremacy of royal authority more comprehensible to the general public. Lope de Vega was particularly emphatic: “*Son divinidad los reyes / el rey sólo es señor, después del cielo*”. Vélez de Guevara wrote that “the King is God on earth”, and Moreto referred to the “sovereign deity” of the king.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the principal political theorists, who were, of course, members of the clergy, avoided a purely religious legitimation of power, perhaps in order that the Papacy need not consider the king his delegate and could claim any superiority over him in return for anointing him as holy. The same jurists from Salamanca who predominated at the Council of Trent always refused to merge the spheres of politics and religion and insisted on the autonomous origins of civil authority. Francisco Suárez, the greatest political theorist of Spanish scholasticism, was categorical: acknowledging that authority had a divine origin, as established by St. Paul, he argued that all of creation had a divine origin and, furthermore, it was logical that only a superior being could establish moral obligations of such weight. However, the earthly subject of political authority was the people who, for Suárez, were a fully constituted legal and moral entity. Consequently, it was the people, and none other, who had to determine the form and powers of government, by means of some kind of original contract that empowered them even to resist those powers if the government overstepped its limits, violated moral law or failed to serve the community which had established it. In his *Defensio Fidei*, Suárez took issue explicitly with the theory of the Divine Right of Kings as upheld by King James I of

England, who based his pretension to be the Head of the Church upon the theory. Francisco de Vitoria, the other great political philosopher from Salamanca, held to similar doctrines. For him, the ultimate source of power was unquestionably divine but its immediate foundation was natural law; all power, including ecclesiastical power, was an institution of natural law and thus neither civil nor ecclesiastical power, orientated as they are towards different ends, could be subordinate to the other. In particular, Vitoria denied that worldly princes could consider themselves vicars or delegates of the Pope, because no-one had granted him temporal dominion over the universe. In short, the Hispanic monarchy of the imperial era was based upon a political theory that justified absolutism, and one could even talk of an alliance between the Altar and the Throne. In other words, there was no *political theologism*, the opposite of what was to occur in the nineteenth century.²⁰

The profound struggle between Catholicism and the monarchy, or between Church and State, came to a head in the eighteenth century as States expanded and *regalist* tendencies became more generalised. In Spain, where the last Hapsburgs had much ground to ecclesiastical privilege, the new Bourbon dynasty of 1700 imported the regalistic outlook of Louis XIV while deprecating the waning of royal power. It should be remembered that the entire state administration – including the standing army – consisted of no more than 30,000 people. This was nothing compared with the immense ecclesiastical bureaucracy which maintained, directly or indirectly, 150,000 to 200,000 people. Felipe V and his successors decided to take the offensive, and they did so on three fronts. Two of these were no more than the classic tactics that continued or escalated the policy of intervention in ecclesiastical matters pursued by the first Hapsburgs. The first was aimed at reinforcing patronage, the *paseregio* and other regalistic rights, chiselling away at the ties that continued to bind the Spanish Church to Rome and completing its submission to domestic civil power, culminating in triumph with the Concordat of 1753. The second, designed to increase the pressure on their own Spanish hierarchy as well as on Rome, was to increase the amount from ecclesiastical revenues that was already flowing into state coffers. Some success was also achieved in this area. The third line of attack was new: an attempt to reduce the power of the clergy over cultural issues such as the control of publications, which was in the hands of the Inquisition, and its monopoly over education, which led to such drastic measures as the expulsion of the Jesuits.²¹ In spite of repeated accusations to the contrary, what no enlightened reformer seriously attempted to do was diminish religious feeling or belief among the subjects of the Hispanic monarchy, far less introduce other religions. Except in isolated cases, such as that of the Conde de Aranda, the sincerity of the Catholicism of reformist ministers and intellectuals in the Bourbon era is not open to question. What angered them, and what they were determined to combat, was the kind of religiosity then dominant, which they believed to be an obstacle to the cultural progress of society. This belief was what inspired such measures as the prohibition of plays about saints in the time of Fernando VI and mystery plays in the time of Carlos III. The magnitude and complexity of the Church at that time, as well as its involvement with the State, explains why a significant number of the clergy themselves – generally the upper echelons, which tended to be the most enlightened sectors – collaborated in this policy, which could

well be classified as anticlerical. The acquiescence and even favourable response by leading members of the clergy to the news of the Jesuits' expulsion is a revealing example of that internal complexity.

In spite of a degree of collaboration, there were sectors - probably the majority and especially among the lower orders - which never forgave the reformists. Absolutism did not permit direct criticism of royal orders, although resentment of the Bourbons would later be expressed by the Catholic historians of the second half of the 19th century. In the 18th century there were harsh allegations against "philosophers" and "Jansenists"; in other words, the intellectuals and ministers who defended the consolidation of royal power to the detriment of the ecclesiastical authorities. *La falsafilosofía*, by Fray Fernando de Ceballos; *El Filoteo*, by Padre Antonio José Rodríguez; *Desengañosfilosóficos*, by Fernández de Valcarce; and the works of Antonio X. Pérez y López, Antonio Vila y Camps and Clemente Peñalosa y Zúñiga, among many others, all express their opposition to enlightened and regalist reforms from the standpoint of the monolithic Catholicism that was supposed to characterise Spain.²²

It was in these mainly ecclesiastical centres of opposition to Bourbon reforms that the Spanish conservatism of the modern age first saw the light of day. The immediate and instinctive line of defence against such reforms was to brand them as heretical. This was partially successful, as even some ministers and other high ranking officials of the monarchy, such as Macanaz and Olavide, saw their careers brought to an abrupt end by an inquisitorial trial. The heresy of which they were accused was Gallicanism which, in Spain, went by the name of Jansenism, which was equally irrelevant to theological dispute.²³ Such exceptions aside, the Inquisition of the 18th century had ceased to be the fearful weapon that it had been in earlier times. Moreover, it had little autonomy of action in relation to royal policy given that its highest office-holders were appointed directly by the king. Those who opposed the Bourbon reforms therefore had to search for a second line of defence, which was to accuse their supporters of being "*afrancesados*", "*extranjerizantes*" or, in short, French or foreign sympathisers. It was then that the anti-regalist, anti-Enlightenment sector of the Church first began to claim identification with "Spanish tradition" and it is here – and not in the Hapsburg era – that one must seek the origins of the future National-Catholicism.

The Hieronymite friar, Fernando de Ceballos, is perhaps the figure who best represents the ecclesiastical sectors opposed to enlightenment policies. His most famous work attacked enlightened rationalism – that "false philosophy" - which was, for him, yet another expression of eternal human rebellion against the divine order, beginning with Cain and more recently personified by Luther. According to Ceballos, every society is founded on the repression of human instincts, perverted after the fall of Adam and Eve, and it was the aim of reformers to eliminate this controlling aspect that made them the enemies of all social order. Nevertheless, while Ceballos detested rebellion, this did not lead him to advocate unlimited monarchical power; on the contrary, he declared himself to be anti-absolutist, because every absolute monarch tended towards regalism and what had to be

defended above all else were the privileges of the Catholic Church. As a result, this formidable reactionary defended the right to resist civil authority when the latter exceeded its jurisdictions. This linked Ceballos to a line of ecclesiastical political thought dating back to the 16th century which had led the Jesuit, Juan de Mariana, to defend nothing less than tyrannicide (further proof that the relationship between Church and State had been less than fraternal).²⁴

Another offensive was launched by Lorenzo Hervás y Panduro, an erudite Jesuit who had emigrated to Italy in the time of Carlos III. His work dates from 1794, when France had already suffered five years of revolutionary turmoil. The immediate danger was no longer regalism but revolution, which had deprived the Church of goods and privileges to a degree undreamt of by any king. Revolution for Hervás, like modern philosophy for Ceballos, was to be explained in terms of moral rebellion and was inspired by pride and, of course, its origins also dated back to Cain and Luther, although its more immediate perpetrators were Jansenists, regalists, philosophers and Protestants. In opposition to the revolutionary world and its satanic postulates of liberty, equality and national sovereignty, Hervás upheld a conception of society as a natural organism, of the same order as the family, with political power comparable in all aspects to paternal authority. It was the old idea of “*jus generationis*” expounded by Robert Filmer and the most conservative political theologians from the time of the first Stuarts, which took on a new lease of life in the reign of Louis XIV thanks to Bossuet, but which had been explicitly opposed by Suárez and Spanish scholasticism during the *Siglo de Oro*. From it, Padre Hervás deduced, firstly, the impossibility of accepting the idea of *patria* as a moral entity from which political rights and duties could flow, and secondly, the illegitimacy of unitary national political representation, which could never substitute the fragmented representation of corporate interests. In contrast to the Hieronymite Ceballos, for the Jesuit Hervás the repository of sovereignty or social *reason* was exclusively the monarch. “In civil society”, he wrote categorically, “its members defend the *Patria* by defending the Sovereign that gives it body”.²⁵

Ultimately, the concerns of Ceballos and Hervás were much the same: namely, the defence of the rights of “God” or, in other words, of the Church. But the former, writing before the Revolution when the idea of the nation was still in its infancy, only conceived of regalism, in alliance with modern philosophy, as the enemy of those rights. The latter, however, had seen the rise of a new enemy, the nation – the offspring of both modern philosophy and regalism – and found no better guarantor of the rights of the Church than the monarch, as did the absolutists in the *Cortes* of Cádiz a few years later. This was probably the reason why the ultra-reactionary work by Hervás was banned by none other than the Inquisition. Although it was a semi-State institution, in the struggle over the rights of Church and State the Inquisition tended to pronounce in favour of the Church, but on this occasion it favoured the construction of a new kind of national legitimacy. The unfavourable verdict on the book by Hervás was written by Joaquín Lorenzo de Villanueva, enlightened canon and future liberal *diputado* of Cádiz, and its publication prohibited by the Bishop Félix Amat, another *ilustrado*. Those who banned the work were obviously not defending the revolution but the State; in the same way

that, by denouncing the revolution, Hervás was not defending the State but the Church of God. Thus a conflict between the Spanish monarchy and the Church of Rome turned the Spanish clergy against one another, revealing how divided they were between their loyalty to the universal Church, on the one hand, and to the Spanish State, of which the church was also a branch, on the other.²⁶

The definitive link between anti-regalist, anti-*ilustrado* rhetoric and the defence of Spanish tradition was to be forged in the years 1793-1795, at the time of the War of the Convention, the joint crusade launched by European monarchs against the French Revolution which ended in fiasco. It is the first time that one can talk of a war “of opinion”, and it was therefore radically different from previous dynastic conflicts. And who better to inflame “opinion” in Spain than the clergy, the only sector able to preach moral exhortations and make political proclamations that would reach large numbers of the populace? As the French Consul in Barcelona noted in 1794, “the monks and priests animated the people”, confirming the mobilising role that they were to repeat in 1808. These lower-ranking members of the clergy were not acting spontaneously but following orders from their superiors: in Barcelona itself, for example, the Bishop ordered his parish priests to say “the litanies with prayers against heretics as in times of war” in their churches; and the Bishop of Valencia laid down the doctrine that it was a “war of religion, a very just and holy war”, which should rightfully be called “war of God, because it is against atheists who deny his Divine Majesty”. Was it a little strange to find priests attributing the paternity of revolutions to the spirit of rebellion embodied in the recent past by rationalist philosophers? It was certainly during the war against the atheist and revolutionary French that the political cry of “God, *Patria*, King”, that would be heard so often forty years later under the banner of Carlism, first sounded.²⁷

Although the conventional Spanish army was defeated and the war lost, the 1793-95 campaign proved quite successful insofar as the population, effectively mobilised by the friars, put up a furious resistance to the French invaders, especially in Catalonia. The rhetoric based on identification of the *patria* with religion, a key device of future National-Catholicism, had made a relatively good start. The Church, as it had always done in the face of collective suffering, attributed the evils of war to divine wrath at collective sinning, but these sins now amounted to the use of “Frenchified” garments and adornments. Under the pretext of praising what was “Spanish”, the preachers who had whipped up the resistance to the French now turned their oratorical skills to condemning sinful “foreign” luxuries, fashions and behaviour. The authorities took this so seriously that they came to publish edicts prohibiting the use of the French style of dress in favour of short breeches and other traditional dress. In this manner, moral reprimand came to be mixed up with the defence of tradition and a culture of xenophobia. In 1793-95, just as in 1808, there were numerous cases of the ill-treatment of the French who lived in Spanish cities, and it was so indiscriminate that even émigrés who had crossed the Pyrenees to flee the Revolution fell victim.²⁸

The booklet most widely circulated during the war was *El soldadocatólico en guerra de religión*, written by a popular preacher called Fray Diego José de Cádiz. At first glance, it appears to be a patriotic tract, as Padre Cádiz decried the “Frenchifying of customs” in the accustomed way. However, on closer examination, one begins to appreciate that the friar was not defending “Spain” and far less the monarchy, but religion. The title itself emphasises the religious bias of the conflict: the *Catholic* soldier in [a] *religious* war. With similar rhetorical extravagance, there are repeated references to religion, the Church, Catholicism and the true faith at least once or twice a page on every one of the hundred or more pages, in contrast with Spain and *patria*, which are mentioned on only a couple of occasions in the entire text. If Padre Cádiz is to be believed, it was not a war of Spain against France but of Catholic believers against the revolution; the revolution brought upon them by materialistic philosophers which had its precedent in the Lutheran rebellion, since both, as Ceballos had explained, expressed the eternal, sinful desire to liberate human animality from the yoke of divine law. The war against the French, concluded Fray Diego de Cádiz, was a war in support of religion, a holy war, a crusade in which Christ, in the form of the Church, opposed Lucifer, incarnate in modern philosophers.²⁹

In short, the anti-modern bias of the political rhetoric that would be used so often by extreme Spanish conservatism in the decades to come was as follows: the current war was not specifically national but universal; in other words, it was not a question of defending Spain against anti-Spain or the enemies of the nation in whatever guise they appeared, but of defending the Catholic Church, Christianity, or the true religion against the snares of Satan contained within rationalism and other modern constructs. This anti-revolutionary, but not specifically national, orientation is what was to characterise the initial identification of Spanishness with the most orthodox Catholicism at the outset of the liberal revolutions.

THE FERNANDIAN NIGHTMARE

By 1808, the ideological spadework for the propaganda campaign against the French had already been accomplished, especially during the War of the Convention. The latter campaign had been under the supreme command of Manuel Godoy, then recently promoted to the highest political offices. Fifteen years later, his career came to an abrupt end. In the interval, he set the country on a course that was very different to the one approved by the anti-enlightenment sectors which had supported him in the war of 1793-95. In fact, he adopted the enlightenment programme of the previous reign. Although his enmity towards certain people, including liberals such as Jovellanos, is well-known, this can be seen as typical of people in a position of unrestrained personal power, whereas his relationship with Moratín and MeléndezValdéz, for example, demonstrate that he was on good terms with the modernising élites. The negative image of Godoy is a reflection of ecclesiastical rather than intellectual opinion, as he stood up to the clergy in the best traditions of Bourbon regalism. The church considered Godoy's programme of disentailment particularly intolerable, as this forced the sale of

between 10% and 15% of ecclesiastical property, which amounted to approximately one seventh of all the agricultural lands belonging to the Church.

Hence the propaganda of 1808-14 was again based on the identification of *Spanish* with “Catholic” and *French* with “atheist” and “sacrilegious”. As Javier Herrero observed some years ago, it turned the conflict into yet another holy war, another “religious crusade”. The “Letter of a prelate to parish priests”, published in the *Diario de Santiago* in June 1808, was categorical in this respect: “In such a conflict it is needful that you should accompany the unceasing fervour of your prayers with your most efficacious preaching and persuasion from the pulpit and in the confessional, in the churches and in the squares, in homes and in all public and private places, to stir your parishioners to take up arms in this holy religious war”.³⁰

If the anti-enlightenment or (after Cádiz) anti-liberal sectors had followed this line of thought, they would have been able to make common cause with the nationalist sentiment taking hold across Europe so vigorously by that time. All they would have had to do was to cultivate the idea that they were the “true Spaniards”, since *España* was already identified with traditional *Catholicism*. By forging a collective identity on such terms, they would have been in a position to expel from the *imagined community* those liberals who, in their opinion, represented the rationalist threat to Catholicism. However, they failed to take advantage of the occasion and, by insisting so much on the defence of *religion*, they left the *nation* in the hands of the liberals.

One indication of the climate in which the anti-Napoleonic campaign unfolded was the pamphlet *Despertador Cristiano-Político* by Fray Simón López and published in Valencia in 1809, a work whose influence could be compared to that of the *Soldadocatólico* by Padre Cádiz in the anti-French conflict fifteen years earlier. Its subtitle speaks volumes: *It is demonstrated that the authors of the universal upheaval of the Church and of the Monarchy are the Freemason philosophers: the diabolical arts that they employ are revealed and the means of obstructing their progress are described*. For the author, who was a *diputadoservil* – one faithful to the king – in Cádiz and later rewarded by Fernando VII with the See of Valencia, the behaviour of the French was “sacreligious, perfidious, bloody, inhuman, irreligious” and Napoleon was the modern Anti-Christ personified, “the Leopard of the Apocalypse”, “one of the seven heads of the Beast”. His followers were “the philosophers of our time”, the “coalition of the irreligious, unbelievers, deists, atheists, heretics, apostates of France and of the whole of Europe” at whose head were the Freemasons and other demonic sects which had managed to bring down the Throne and the Altar and install deism in France and then tried to extend it to the whole of Europe where “they find insuperable obstacles in the Clergy, Monarchs and Nobility”.³¹ Observe that the good priest does not specifically mention Spanish forces opposing the impious revolution, but universal, or at least European, ones. Peculiar to the Spanish case is the fact that although such perfidious creatures had easy access into the country because it was ruled by their own (Godoy, the favourite who was the “ambitious, lecherous, irreligious [...]”

satellite of Napoleon”), until that moment it had managed to avoid the fate of other states in Europe “thanks to the loving providence of our God, thanks to the unity of the holy Catholic Religion, which we profess to the exclusion of all false sects, to which our King and our kingdom undoubtedly owe their conservation and their independence”. In short, the fight is between the just or the believers against the conspiracy of materialistic philosophers and therefore of no national significance. It is true that “all nations have turned their eyes to Spain” which stands out for her fierce resistance to the rising tide of malignancy, but her tenacity is due only to her Catholic *unity*, to the “exclusion of all false sects”.³²

This approach to the war with the French on the basis of the Catholic identity of Spain was apparently common to all the troops fighting Napoleon, including their leaders. And however much their enemies later questioned their Catholicism, the liberals in Cadiz were also generally believers and they had not the slightest intention of undermining the Catholic unity of Spanish society. It is enough to recall Article 12 of the Constitution, which declared the confessionality of the country with a commitment startling for any reader who associates liberalism with the religious neutrality of public power: “The Religion of the Spanish Nation is *and shall be in perpetuity the only true Roman Catholic and Apostolic [one]*. The Nation protects it with wise and just laws and *forbids the exercise of any other*”.

Typical also of constitutionalist sentiment in Cadiz were the catechisms that today one would not hesitate to call *political* but which, in their day, were known, significantly, as *Catholico-political, religious-civil* or *religious, moral and political*. One of them stated, in a manner repeated almost literally by the rest, that the word *español* was the equivalent of “good man”. This, it went on to clarify, meant a person whose ethical and political conduct was governed by the “maxims of Jesus Christ and the Gospels”. His obligations, it continued, were three: “to be a Roman Catholic and Apostolic Christian; to defend his religion, his *patria* and his law; and to die before suffering defeat”.³³

However, this should not mislead us. It was one thing for the *diputados* to be Catholic and to continue defending the Catholic unity of the nation, but quite another for them to found the national identity on traditional religiosity or be prepared to perpetuate the privileged situation of the Church. The religious measures drawn up by the constitutional *Cortes* were aimed unambiguously at the reform of the Church and a reduction of its social power: the number of regular clergy was reduced, the State appropriated more ecclesiastical revenues and, above all, the Inquisition was abolished and freedom of the press was established. Of all the debates, the one that caused the greatest passion concerned the suppression of the Inquisition, an issue that had a special symbolic value for both absolutists (also known by the derogatory term *serviles*) and liberals. For the former, it ensured the religious unity that was regarded as an indispensable guarantee and exclusive privilege of the *Spanish* against fratricidal discord. For the latter, it represented the suppression of intellectual freedom, the main cause of *Spanish* decline under the Hapsburgs. Herein lay the dividing line between the two different kinds of

Catholics and the two future visions of the Nation: the same line that had separated pro- and anti-Enlightenment supporters.

In Cádiz, the invocation of Catholicism in defence of the nation varied greatly. The anti-revolutionary and even anti-Enlightenment invective of the popular preachers did little for those who considered themselves the heirs of the Enlightenment and who pursued an openly revolutionary liberal legislative agenda. For the liberals, the struggle was designed to end, first, foreign tyranny, and then domestic tyranny, for which it was necessary to establish a political system based on the principle of national sovereignty. Quintana's *SemanarioPatriótico*, the principal organ of the constitutionalists, constantly urged the Spanish people to fulfill their patriotic duty but, as François-Xavier Guerra has pointed out, "The subject of religion is conspicuous by its absence in every issue, with one single but significant exception: when, in November of 1808, Madrid was on the point of succumbing to Napoleon's troops, the people were called upon 'to defend Religion and the *Patria*', which is indicative of the mobilising force of the call to arms".³⁴

In a similar but contrasting vein, the absolutists had an aversion to 'Spain'. Certainly they felt that the *patria* was of value, and even believed that they were its most genuine representatives. Still, they avoided mentioning it by name if at all possible, choosing instead to talk about the monarchy or religion. Their discomfort became even greater if, instead of Spain or "*patria*", the term 'nation' was used, as this hinted at "national sovereignty", the true *bête noire* of the absolutists. The repugnance caused by references to the nation is illustrated by a short poem by the absolutist, María Manuel López, in 1813:

"Españoles, viles imbuidos / en el orgullo y voces seductivas
de igualdad, libertad y, ¡qué delirio! / nación, independencia, ciudades,
derechosnaturales e imprescritos..."

Not only the term "nation" but even "independence" is condemned in this verse. Indeed, Fernando's absolutist supporters generally endeavoured to avoid glorifying the war. The decree that re-established the Inquisition even lamented the deterioration in the "purity of religion in Spain" during the conflict as a result of the "presence of foreign troops of diverse sects, all equally infected by their hatred of the Holy Roman Church".³⁵

The return of Fernando VII and his assumption of absolute power did not mean a restoration of the *antiguorégimen* in the strictest sense. Fernando responded to the destruction wrought by the war on the institutions and ideas of the absolutist era by placing his trust entirely in the hands of the Catholic church, a radical rupture with the policy of his predecessors. Reluctant to found the political system on a principle as dangerous as the *nation*, Fernando had no alternative but to entrust the defence of his absolute monarchy to the same clergy that had preached during the wars of 1793-1808 that the political and social structures were untouchable because they had been established by God. Fernando returned to the Church the convents, properties and rights of which it had been deprived by Joseph Bonaparte and the constitutionalists, as well as re-establishing the Inquisition and even re-

admitting the Society of Jesus to his kingdom (which was to return to the days of Carlos III rather than restore the old regime). Other measures did not smack so strongly of restoration: the old councils, for example, became “shadows of their former selves”, as Artola states. At certain times, the king placed power in the hands of his confessor, an unprecedented move, and at others in a Council of State that comprised the most intransigent of absolutists, including his brother, the Infante Don Carlos, and those who were to become his most notorious followers, the Bishop of León and Fray Cirilo de la Alameda. Altogether, he augmented the power of the Church to a level approaching theocracy, an unheard of situation. In exchange, the Church hailed him time after time as “the anointed holder of the Throne”, “sweet Fernando”, “beloved Fernando”, “defender of the holy religion”, and for having been “triumphant over the horrendous monster of impiety.”³⁶ The king was unable to see that, in the new political world, he would have defended the crown more effectively by proclaiming himself “first among Spaniards”, the most heroic and long-suffering representative of “Spain”.

When the Constitution of Cadiz was restored as a result of Riego’s *pronunciamiento* in 1820, the supporters of Fernando raised levies against the revolutionary government which were not called “patriotic” or “national” but “apostolic” or the “army of the Faith”. The most extreme of the king’s supporters also organised themselves into a body called “*royal* volunteers” in answer to the liberal national militia, but this was created “in close collaboration with the Catholic Church”, according to Artola. It is significant that the proclamation published in 1823 by the guerrilla friar known as *El Trapense* did not begin with a call to arms to “Spaniards!” but with one to “My brothers in Jesus Christ”. It also finished with “Long live Jesus! Long live Holy Mary! Long live the Holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic Religion! Long live the King our lord!” The proclamations of the Royal Junta that was set up in Navarre during the *trienio* of 1820-23 were also almost exclusively religious in nature: “Brave and generous Navarrese: [...] Beneath the dense and deceitful veil of the Constitution, in place of the promised felicity, were concealed the altars of impiety in order to sacrifice upon them at one and the same time Religion, the King and the *Patria* [...] Know you well that its purpose (the pen shudders at these words) is to separate you totally from obedience to, and spiritual communion with, the Vicar of Jesus Christ. Know you that these barbarous monsters of iniquity who try to deprive you of your Religion are also the declared enemies of the Throne”.³⁷ The most extreme of liberals responded by calling themselves “*comuneros*”. Perhaps it was never so clear as during the *Trienio* that the nation was a specifically liberal myth which the absolutists attempted to counter by invoking religion.

For the liberals, it was bad enough that the revolutionary experiment of 1820-23 failed and that Fernando was returned to power for a second time. What made it even worse was that this was the result of foreign intervention, thereby underlining the non-national nature of Fernando’s absolutism. France sent an army to restore Fernando which was not, on this occasion, dedicated to the revolutionary Goddess of Reason, but to Saint Louis. Those who, only six years earlier, had denigrated France for being a hotbed of enlightened philosophy, corruption and atheism now

applauded it enthusiastically. One of them, José Antonio Llanos, in his *Memorias Poéticas*, reserves his highest praise for the “valiant and generous Gaul”, while condemning “the libertine race”, or Spanish liberals. A national framing of the conflict - of Spaniard against Frenchmen - is eschewed in favour of the universal, ideological war of Catholic against revolutionary. The poem mentions both the *Madre Patria* and Iberia, but not Spain, while the only person found worthy of the adjective “holy” is Fernando.³⁸

Back in absolute power in 1823, Fernando once again earned the epithet of “holy” by throwing himself back onto the Church – a Church now reduced to its anti-enlightenment sectors as a result of the appointments and promotions that were pushed during the first period of his reign. Under pressure from the French, he none the less created the *Juntas de Fe* in order to continue the work of the Holy Office. Just like the Inquisition, the *Juntas* could condemn people to death, but, hypocritically, their execution was left to the ordinary system of justice. The Valencian schoolmaster Antonio Ripoll was the last person to be burnt at the stake, three hundred and fifty years after the Holy Office had been founded. The *Junta* that condemned the unfortunate Ripoll was acting under instructions from the Archbishop of Valencia, the same Fray SimónLópez who had written the *Despertador* in 1809.³⁹

During its final decade of 1823-33, absolutism had the support of a number of what Pedro C. González Cuevas has termed “legitimizing theologians”, including AtilanoDehaxo Solórzano, José Clemente Carnicero and Francisco Puigserver. According to this author, the most important cultural and ideological undertaking of the period was the *Biblioteca de la Religión*, edited by the Cardinal of Toledo, Pedro de Inguanzo, who had been a leading absolutist *diputado* in Cádiz. This comprised French and Italian counter-revolutionary writers who dealt with the Pope and the Catholic faith while highlighting the evils of impiety and the punishment of unbelievers.⁴⁰ Opinion in Spain may have been deeply divided over Fernando, but the most conservative sectors in Europe were delighted with him. In 1824, no less than Joseph de Maistre, the great champion of the Catholic Counter-Revolution in the Latin world, dedicated his *Six Lettres sur l’Inquisition espagnole* to defending the institution that had safeguarded Spain’s spiritual unity. Spain was the model for the alliance between Altar and Throne; an alliance that was perhaps circumstantial but nevertheless far closer than in the time of Felipe II. It was, in fact, an anti-national alliance between two supra-national powers: on the one hand, the Altar, embodied in the Pope and the various territorial branches of the Church, and, on the other, the Throne, represented by the coalition of absolute monarchs.

Apología del Trono y el Altar was the very title of a work published in 1818 by the Capuchin monk, Rafael de Vélez, which Javier Herrero considers to be “the most systematic construction of reactionary ideology of the age”. Rewarded after the first restoration, like Fray SimónLópez, with a bishopric, his career continued to prosper after the second in 1823, when he was appointed Archbishop of Santiago. His general political theories are not relevant here, but it is enough to say that Archbishop Vélez found all rational or scientific approaches to political theory to be

suspect, including Aristotle and the most distinguished names of Catholic scholasticism. He considered the ‘science’ of public law and political economy to be particularly dangerous as, according to him, it was destructive of the social order. It was from this ‘science’ that the Constitutionalist had derived their “false” if not openly “heretical principles”, such as that nations preceded kings. “Were there ever children without parents?”, asked Vélez rhetorically. No less heretical, in his eyes, was the assertion that kings were born in order to serve nations and not nations for kings. Instead of continuing scholastic thought, Vélez was representative of the absolutist mindset, reiterating the ideas of Filmer and Bossuet that had been taken up by Hervás: society is ordered like the family and it is constitutively hierarchical. Power is always transmitted from superior to inferior and never the other way around. The king receives his power directly from God, whom he represents while he reigns – and before whom he is solely responsible – and magistrates receive power from the king, whom they, in turn, represent and to whom they answer. Only the sovereign, the bearer of divine authority and the guarantor of order, possesses political legitimacy. The nation does not exist in this sense. According to Vélez, the sovereignty of the people is not only absurd, it is sinful. Those who advocate it, or demand popular participation in legislation, are claiming powers that do not correspond to them and which offend not only the sovereign, but also the divine order.⁴¹

In conclusion, Spanish political literature in the reign of Fernando, like the propaganda of the 1793-95 war and most of that of the 1808-14 conflict, was fuelled by anti-enlightenment, anti-revolutionary *Catholic* polemicists, whose thinking diverged from the *Spanish* scholastic tradition. Although the most prominent of these thinkers were later acclaimed by Menéndez Pelayo and even by some relatively recent Francoist historians, they lacked both originality and quality in comparison not only with the outstanding figures of earlier eras of Spanish intellectual history, but even with the other European counter-revolutionary thinkers of their time. It is precisely the absence of originality that is most striking in their work as well as its *afrancesamiento*, however strange this might seem in such stubborn defenders of the Spanish tradition or “way of life”. The whole period was one of little creativity within Catholic thought in general, while in Spain it was limited to the imitation, even plagiarism, of French and Italian polemicists.

By choosing not to present himself as the personification of an “eternal Spain”, of the glorious nation that had just defeated the invincible Napoleon, Fernando VII showed that he failed to understand that the most conservative sectors of the Church disliked the nation precisely because such a myth could strengthen the power of the State. It did not occur to him that his chosen followers were not going to welcome his own attempts – as *Head of State*, for he was not a religious authority – at building a strong state, even though his purpose was very different to that of the liberal nationalists.

CARLISM, ANOTHER LOST OPPORTUNITY

The last ten years of the tragic reign of Fernando, from the intervention of the Hundred Thousand Sons of Saint Louis to the death of the king in 1833, is still known today as the “Ominous Decade”. The history books tend to dismiss these years in a few lines, as a black period of terror and obscurantism, but it was also the time when the rapprochement between Altar and Throne finally came to an end.

It could be claimed that the alliance first began to break down as early as 1824, the year in which it was recognised that it was impossible to restore the situation to its previous state: the dire financial straits of the Treasury prevented it from returning certain property to the Church, while the allies had refused to countenance the reintroduction of the Inquisition. It could also be argued that the first cracks appeared in 1826-27, when the death of John VI of Portugal led to a liberal revolution and civil war in which the Spanish court was heavily involved. Or the cracks might be said to date from 1830, when the Bourbons were supplanted in France by Louis Philippe de Orléans, who established a liberal monarchy, and when Fernando, who had married for the fourth time, finally found himself with an heir, although she was female and in delicate health. Hard pressed by the wretched state of affairs at the Treasury and the impossibility of obtaining new loans, the absolute monarch found himself obliged to resort to a group of what González Cuevas calls “bureaucratic conservatives” (of the sort known under Francoism as “technocrats”), who undertook a series of modernising changes. The Minister of Finance, López Ballesteros, belonged to this group and, at a later date, so did CeaBermúdez and Javier de Burgos. One of the measures taken by López Ballesteros was the creation of a Ministry of Development. Today, its functions would be considered more technical than political, but the clergy interpreted them as an attack upon the structure of the *Antiguo Regimen* and the social functions that had traditionally corresponded to themselves. Protests soon followed. The police corps, another Bonapartist invention, was created in 1824 and soon came up against “strong opposition from those who preferred the re-establishment of the Inquisition, considered to be more efficient and more reliable in combatting the liberals”. The ‘royal volunteers’ in particular demanded that the king suppress the police force.⁴² They reasoned that there was no need for the police - an invention of the Freemasons - if there already existed within the Spanish tradition an institution of such proven efficacy in maintaining religious unity and social peace as the Inquisition.

Mixed in with cries of ‘death to the police’ and ‘long live the Inquisition’ came, for the first time, shouts of protest from hardline absolutists against their illustrious idol, Fernando. In November 1826, the “Federation of Pure Royalists” published a manifesto that repudiated Fernando VII in the harshest terms (“the debility, stupidity, ingratitude and bad faith of that unworthy prince, of that parricide...”). There are doubts about the authorship of the document, but the following year there was a royalist rebellion against Fernando known as the *guerradels Malcontents* which was to be the prelude to the Carlist wars of the 1830s. The rallying cries were along the same lines as the manifesto but without the insults to

the king: “long live religion, long live the absolute king, long live the Inquisition, death to Freemasonry and all occult sects”. When he rebelled in Reus, Rafi Vidal claimed that his aim was to “sustain and defend with our lives the sweet and sacred names of religion, king and Inquisition”. The names of the ultra rightwing secret societies that conspired against Fernando in his last years clearly coincided with this religious, not national, orientation: *La Purísima*, the Exterminating Angel, the Apostolic Juntas, the Army of the Faith, etc.

In spite of the reverence in which the absolute monarch was held, this was a rebellion against his policies. In reality, the king was timidly endeavouring to modernise the State. Those in revolt defended the Inquisition and the convents, asylums and hospitals that the State was trying to replace with a police force and a Ministry of Development. The ultra-absolutists had forced the government into an impossible situation because “it could not deal with any of the fundamental social issues”. In other words, the government was unable to adapt the State to meet the needs of the moment. Nor could it modernise the economy “without its attempts being considered as a capitulation to liberal or enlightened thought”.⁴³

At this point, the absolutist extremists who rejected the king’s policies began to broach the idea of the Infante Don Carlos as an alternative to Fernando. What were the merits of Don Carlos and what was his programme? According to Artola, his ideology “is so barren as to defy analysis. It is devoid of any idea beyond a total surrender to the will of God”. This opinion does not seem to be an exaggeration: among the most significant of his papers are the oft-quoted recommendations given by Don Carlos to his brother at the height of the crisis in the summer of 1826: “Let there be holy fear of God and there will be good customs, virtues, peace, tranquility, joy and all”. The manifesto of the “Federation of Pure Royalists”, in which the name of the pious Infante was first mooted, read: “Let us make the air resound with hymns of praise to entreat the help of the Almighty [...] Let us place in his divine hands the future destinies of our beloved *patria* [...] Let us proclaim as its leader his August Majesty Señor Don Carlos V, because the virtues of this prince, his adherence to the clergy and to the Church are even greater guarantees”. However much Don Carlos claimed to be following in the Spanish tradition, there are clearly no precedents of such an openly theocratic programme.⁴⁴

Upon the death of the disastrous Fernando in 1833, the supporters of his brother rebelled. Although the ostensible reason for the rebellion was the issue of the succession, this was merely, “the pretext that serv[ed] to unleash the conflict that existed between two political tendencies and, more especially, between two social groups that refused to coexist. The first Carlist war is fundamentally a belated combat in defence of the socioeconomic structures of the *antiguorégimen*...”. Indeed it was, but this analysis overlooks that fact that its purpose was also to defend a political theocracy of a type unknown under the *antiguorégimen*. It comes as no surprise that the Church was so heavily involved in the Carlist uprising because the Church network was, without a shadow of a doubt, the means of mobilising the Carlists, just as it had mobilised other forces in the wars of 1793-95, 1808, 1822 and 1827, and just as it had refrained from doing as a result of the

invasion of the Hundred Thousand Sons of Saint Louis in 1823. As soon as the rebellion began, a “secret Regency” was set up, two of whose three members were the General of the Jesuits and the Bishop of León. Fray Cirilo de la Alameda, the Franciscan Archbishop of Cuba and ultra-absolutist ex-member of the Council of State under Fernando, would become a member of the equivalent Carlist institution and preside over the Council in the absence of the pretender.⁴⁵

It is no exaggeration to say that Carlism was the most important politico-social movement in nineteenth century Spain. However, there is no general agreement amongst historians over the reasons for its success. Given that Carlism was a populist movement rooted in an emotional rather than an intellectual appeal, scrutiny of its symbols and slogans may be more instructive than its ideology. Among the symbols is the flag with the cross of Burgundy, sometimes known as the cross of Saint Andrew, a symbol of apparently religious significance but also used as a dynastic emblem by the Spanish Hapsburgs as Dukes of Burgundy. For a Bourbon to raise a Hapsburg standard could only signal their intention of re-establishing a counter-reformist, imperial monarchy. That aside, it is not in any sense a national symbol. As for the anthem, it praised the excellences of the Holy Tradition, which indicates adherence to the beliefs and institutions of their predecessors. The best known phrase was “God, *Patria*, King”, which was repeatedly invoked and merits close attention. The first word of the triad is “God” and the fact that it comes first is significant in itself. There can be no doubt about the religious orientation of the Carlist army, which was sometimes called the “Army of the Faith”. A proclamation by the Carlist colonel, Basilio García, in 1834, invoked “the most holy of the throne and the altar” and ended with an appeal to join “the ranks of the friends of our good God” with a “long live religion and long live Carlos V!”. Don Carlos was once moved to name the *Virgen de los Dolores* as supreme commander of his armies. It was common for the Carlist troops to attend mass and even to say the rosary on a daily basis. There can be no question about the unequivocal Catholicism of the Carlism. There is no great mystery to this religiosity: it is a case of traditional Counter-Reformation Spanish Catholicism, which was under threat from the increasing number of functions appropriated by the State. Opposition to State expansion goes some way to explaining the support for Carlism from certain sectors of the nobility and other privileged groups on the periphery, which clung to the idea of the “traditional monarchy” and the mediaeval “*fueros*” as a means of impeding the advance of the State.

Less clear is the meaning of the second word in this triad, “*Patria*”. It had been included for a long time and was cited by absolutist orators during the wars of 1793-95 and 1808, as well as during the uprising of the *Malcontents*. Under Carlism, it became a commonplace, as in “We have duties to the king, the *patria* and the religion” or “we deserve the blessing of God, the love of the sovereign and the gratitude of the *patria*”. Not one of the references to the *patria* can be taken as an expression of nationalism. The content of “*patria*” is not just different but almost the opposite of “nation”. The latter concept took for granted the existence of a collective subject that was, or could become, the bearer of sovereignty. In order for such a possibility to be realised, it was necessary to construct a series of myths,

related to the past, in which the great virtues of the chosen people were highlighted in their collective exploits or in those of their individual heroes. Carlism makes no such references to Spanish heroes such as Viriato, Don Pelayo or El Cid, nor to collective deeds such as the conquest of America. It does eulogise the *patria*, but the term refers to no more than a collection of “traditions”: fundamental beliefs, privileges, laws and institutions that were by no means exclusive to Spain but typical of every *Ancien Régime* in Europe. The “*patria*” was embodied in the King and Religion, and that was as true for a Spanish legitimist as it was for any of the Austrian, Russian and particularly French absolutist volunteers who fought for Don Carlos. “*Patria*”, in short, was empty of meaning.⁴⁶

The third word is “King” which, at first sight, appears to be as clear as the word “God”. “Who can save Spain, apart from God and her legitimate king?” asked the Bishop of Urgel. To be a “Royalist”, or faithful to the King, meant essentially to submit oneself blindly to the monarch, to accept royal absolutism, and to recognise the unlimited authority of the legitimate heir to the crown. But Fernando VII was legitimate and yet absolutists had *not* submitted to his orders in 1826-27; neither did they accept his annulment of the Salic Law. Decades later, they also refused to submit to other Carlist pretenders as soon as they detected any sign of divergence from the orthodox line of thought: *Juan III* was delegitimised by the Princess of Beira, and the Duke of Madrid, *Carlos VII* himself, by Ramón Nocedal, who argued that the pretender had “legitimacy of origin” but not “of exercise”. In other words, loyalty to an absolute king was *not* blind. However much the movement defined itself as *Carlist*, the basis of its identity was not founded on any kind of personal fidelity to Don Carlos or his legitimate successors. On occasion, this was admitted by the theorists: Joaquín Muzquiz went so far as to say that the aim of the movement was to “found a new nationality on the Catholic idea, before which the old peoples and their old legitimacies disappear”.⁴⁷ This is an extraordinary text: it discusses the foundation of a new identity which, although it is called a “nationality”, is not national but Catholic. Confronted by the latter, the “old legitimacies”, including both the national and the dynastic, disappear. The only basis for legitimacy is Catholicism. Thus, the only authority to which Ramón Nocedal would submit after he had dared to challenge the pretender and found the *Partido Integrista* was that of the Pope, who finally ordered him to disband his party. “King”, the third concept, proves to be almost as flimsy as “*Patria*”. Only one is unequivocal: God, to which might be added, Religion and Catholicism.

Pérez Galdós, in his *Episodios Nacionales*, repeatedly viewed the Carlist wars as the confrontation of “religion” and “freedom”. The incompatibility between traditional religious identity and the new national legitimacy reached such a pitch that, on more than one occasion, the figure of the Carlist friar was described as entering *pueblos* with the cry of “Long live religion, long live the king, down with the nation!” on his lips. Pío Baroja recalled a friar by the name of Orri and nicknamed *Padre Puñal*, who was famous for his “Death to the nation!”. Galdós also describes absolutist crowds shouting the same thing.⁴⁸ The right detested the word “nation”. The Isabelline or liberal troops referred to themselves as “nationalists”, which is ironic given that, just one hundred years later, during the civil war of 1936-39, it

would be the insurgent right that adopted the same terminology. In both cases, these were civil wars with international implications: during the Carlist war the liberals received considerable help from the British, though this played down for domestic reasons. By contrast, the Carlists had no such reservations about resorting to international appeals for men, money and arms, though with little success. They were, however, joined by some French and Central European volunteers; these were legitimists who fought in Spain for the cause they would have liked to have defended in their own countries and who regarded it as a common cause. One of the French legitimists, the Comte de Villemur, was named Minister for War by Don Carlos in 1834. A fictional Carlist in the *Episodionacional* complains about not receiving more international assistance, claiming that “here we are fighting for the cause of all the powers, for legitimate thrones, against revolution and Jacobinism”. Indeed, the Carlist *Boletín* of 1838 maintained it was in the interests of “all the governments of Europe”, of “all civilised peoples”, to help Don Carlos “stifle the revolution”. Most significant of all was the moral support which the Carlists received from the Pope, who refused to recognise Isabel II for a long time. In return, they became heavily involved in the Italian struggles, taking up the cause of the Pope as their own.⁴⁹ All of this points to the tenuous patriotic or national nature of the movement. In the twentieth-century civil war, however, when the Nationalists had become the right, they benefited from the crucial support of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, but, true to their national role, it was now they who made a huge effort to conceal the fact. On this occasion, it was their rivals who boasted of the international support and of the weapons received from Stalin. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a strong identification with national sentiment had become a feature of the right, while the left had diluted it with references to numerous other modern political myths, such as equality, democracy, progress and social revolution. At the beginning of the nineteenth, the situation had been the opposite: the left portrayed itself as national while the loyalties of the right were divided between nation, dynasty and, above all, religion.

THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WORLD VISION: THE CHURCH AGAINST THE EVIL OF MODERNITY

The culmination of the counter-revolutionary vision in Spain is represented by the later work of Juan Donoso Cortés, the great mid-century reactionary, whose thought underlines just how far removed that vision was from nationalism. Juan Donoso Cortés, Marqués de Valdegamas and the Spanish ambassador to Paris during the revolutionary events of 1848, was one of the few political thinkers from the Peninsula whose political thought had any impact in Europe. This may be precisely because his work was not centred on Spanish problems. He portrayed a conflict that was not between Spain and anti-Spain, but between Catholicism and the demons of modernity: materialism, immorality, and the revolution that was destroying civilisation. And he was unparalleled in the apocalyptic manner in which he expressed that struggle. Believing himself to be a new Augustine of Hippo witnessing the collapse of the Roman Empire, he conceived of his *Ensayo sobre el catolicismo, el liberalismo y el socialismo* as a new *City of God*, setting out the final great battle between Catholic civilisation and rationalist error.⁵⁰ For him, as for

Hervás y Panduro, Ceballos, Barruel, De Maistre and Alvarado, the origin of the problem was to be sought in rationalism. “Reason follows error wherever it goes”, was one of the aphorisms at which he excelled. One of his formulations, as categorical as it was arbitrary, described the successive incarnations of “rationalist error”: in the 17th century, it was Protestantism, in the 18th century, it was enlightenment philosophy, in the 19th century, it was liberalism, which, by 1848, had revealed its true face: socialism. [OJO: last phrase okay?] This was an anarchic socialism, as personified in Pierre Joseph Proudhon, in whom Donoso had identified the new anti-Christ, the leader of the revolutionary hordes who were coming to destroy all excellence and all civilisation; a tide of destruction that would lead to an egalitarian tyranny of unimaginable dimensions. All Donoso Cortés could think of to counteract this revolutionary wave was for a “religious reaction”, for a “Catholic dictatorship”. He clamoured for it not only for Spain but also for Europe as he believed the problem extended far beyond national borders.⁵¹

Except for the force of his arguments – and the quality of his prose – there is nothing in the work of Donoso Cortés in 1848 that had not been written by Alvarado or Barruel thirty and fifty years before. “Behind every political issue there is always a religious issue”, went another of the axioms that made him famous. This sums up what all of them had to say: that modern rationalism was a satanic theology, that it had inevitably evolved from Protestantism to Enlightenment philosophy, revolutionary liberalism and, finally, socialist egalitarianism and anarchic barbarism. [OJO: last phrase okay?] Just like the other counter-revolutionary thinkers considered in this chapter, Donoso believed in the absolute incompatibility between Catholic civilisation - based on submission to natural hierarchies and the repression of base instincts - and any sociopolitical organisation that was founded on natural reason and the satisfaction of earthly desires. As Begoña Urigüen concludes, “the most radical principle of Donoso’s anti-*moderantismo* [is] the irreconcilability between truth and error, between Religion and Philosophy, between the Church and Revolution”.⁵²

Of most interest here is the fact that there is still no room for the nation in the ideas of this outstanding representative of Spanish conservatism in the mid-nineteenth century. The nation continued to be as suspect to him as it had been to the theorists of absolutism in the time of Fernando, a suspicion which was no doubt fanned by the nationalist fervour which he witnessed at first hand during the revolutions of 1848. Those who, he wrote, “worship popular sovereignty worship an absurdity [...] In the normal state of societies, the people do not exist, only interests, [...] opinions, [...] parties” exist.⁵³ It is understandable that he should have been at odds with González Bravo, a politician with a liberal background who was moving towards extreme conservatism, but who based his position on a radical affirmation of the rights of the Spanish nation. Donoso, in contrast, took a European point of view. His inspiration came from Augustin Barruel, from Joseph de Maistre and from all the Franco-Italian anti-Enlightenment thought (Bergier, Nonotte, Valsechi, Mozzi) that had also influenced Vélez and Alvarado. Far more cosmopolitan than they were, Donoso felt openly European; he wrote for a European public and published his *Ensayos sobre el catolicismo* in French as well as Spanish. In the final years of his life, he also wrote a *Llamamiento a los*

conservadores (the European ones) and did what he could to achieve an anti-revolutionary alliance of the continental Christian monarchies to counteract the liberal policy of the British – which included appeals to Louis Napoleon and the retired Metternich. It was an alliance that was to have been sponsored and protected by the Church, the only entity truly capable of saving societies from the “danger of death” by which they were threatened.⁵⁴ Donoso’s wisdom was passed on through Louis Veuillot and had a clear influence on Pope Pius IX and his *Syllabus*.

Two last aspects of conservative thought will also illustrate its explicitly anti-national bias. The word *nacionalismo* was first used by Abbot Barruel in his *Memorias para servir a la historia del jacobinismo* of 1798, in which he makes it clear that he regards the phenomenon as yet another perversion of modernity. Eugene Kamenka explains that, for Abbot Barruel, nationalism meant “the bringing down of legitimate governments whose right to exercise authority is based on divine will or hereditary rights”, which was linked to the “terrible spirit of freemasonry and the Enlightenment, rooted in selfishness”. In the words of the abbot, when “*nationalism*, or national love, replaces a general love towards humanity [...] it becomes a virtue to expand at the expense of those who do not belong to your State [...] to despise foreigners, deceive them, insult them. This virtue receives the name of *patriotism*, in other words, *egotism*”. This counter-revolutionary abbot certainly had a point when he claimed that nationalism was an expression of collective egotism. Nevertheless, he was not the appropriate ideologue to promote Spanish nationalism as interpreted in Catholic-conservative terms.

Further, the conservative world felt only distrust of nationalism. For Metternich, the Austro-Hungarian Chancellor, nationalism was one of the first examples of the dangers of modern politics. In the 1840s, the Vatican flirted with the idea of making the Papacy the focal point of Italian unity, but the revolutionary whirlwind of 1848 eliminated that possibility for good. Thereafter, the previously liberal Pius IX opposed the idea of the nation just as he opposed that of liberalism. Not even the Catholic nationalism of Poland was supported by the Pope. In 1864, after seeing his Papal territories seized by Italian nationalists, he published his famous *Syllabus*, in which, holding faithfully to the theories of Barruel, Joseph de Maistre, Alvarado and Donoso, he condemned all and sundry: rationalism, deism, tolerance, liberalism, socialism and nationalism. In sum, reconciliation of the See of Peter with “progress, liberalism and modern civilisation” was impossible. Over time, and with no little hesitation and difficulty, his successors have modified this position. This is just as well, for if the Catholic Church had indeed made no concessions to modernity it would have eventually become an increasingly marginal and eccentric faith with a steady reduction in the number of its followers.

It is significant that, in Spain, the only ones to greet the appearance of the *Syllabus* with any enthusiasm were the *integristas* of Ramón Nocedal, who were so conservative that they eventually became unacceptable even to the Carlists. Ramón Nocedal considered himself to be the intellectual heir of Donoso Cortés and in that respect, at least, he was right. Pidal y Mon, the leader of moderate Catholicism,

who brought a large number of old Traditionalists into the fold of *canovista* conservatism around 1880, was also right when he branded the influence of Donoso Cortés on Spanish Catholicism as a “calamity”.⁵⁵

In conclusion, Spanish conservatism in the second half of the nineteenth century had begun to rectify its thinking of earlier decades. It would continue to identify with Catholicism and to defend the “*patria*” and sacrosanct “Spanish traditions”, but it would also begin to combine the former with the latter in an amalgam that, much later, would come to be known as *National-Catholicism*. By accepting and developing the idea of *nation*, it became integrated into the modern world. This is not a value judgement: modernity is not necessarily either positive or negative, but survival is impossible without being a part of it. For better or worse, Spanish Catholic conservatism made the minimal adjustment required in order to survive in the modern world.

NOTES

¹S. López, *Despertador Cristiano-Político*, Valencia, 1809, pp. 17 and 18; M. Amado, *Dios y España: o sea, Ensayo sobre una demostración histórica de lo que debe España a la Religión Católica*, Madrid, 1831, vol. III, p. 261.

²Napoleon, according to R. Nürnberger, quoted by P. C. González Cuevas, *Historia de las derechas españolas*, Madrid, 2000, p. 67. Invocations, in F.-X. Guerra, *Modernidad e Independencias*, Madrid, 1992, p. 158.

³In spite of the high number of university students in 16th Century Spain (a number that would drop sharply in the 17th), according to R. Kagan, *Students and Society in Early Modern Spain*, Johns Hopkins, 1974.

⁴G. Hermet, *Les catholiques dans l’Espagne franquiste*, Paris, 1980-81, vol. I, p. 63.

⁵Etymology of *marranos*, see J. Caro Baroja, *Los judíos en la España moderna y contemporánea*, Madrid, 1978, vol. I, p. 129; for prosecutions, see Y. Baer, *Historia de los judíos en la España cristiana*, Madrid, 1981, vol. II, or B. Netanyahu, *The Origins of the Inquisition in Fifteenth-Century Spain*, New York, 1995; figures of *conversos*, discrepancies between A. Domínguez Ortiz, *Los judeoconversos...*, p. 41, and B. Netanyahu, *Los marranos españoles*, Valladolid, 1994, pp. 203-211.

⁶J. García Mercadal, *Viajes...*, I, pp. 295-296, 309-326 and 328-417; J. Liske, *Viajes de extranjeros por España y Portugal en los siglos XV, XVI y XVII*, Madrid, 1878, pp. 46 and 55-57.

⁷See, among others, J. Meseguer Fernández, *Historia de la Inquisición en España y América*, Madrid, 1984, vol. I, pp. 395-397. According to P. Dedieu, by 1540 Judaism was already “a residual phenomenon” (quoted by A. Domínguez Ortiz, *Los judeoconversos...*, p. 36); to A. Milhou, around 1525-1530 Cryptojudaism had been essentially dismantled in Spain (“La culturacristiana...”, pp. 1 and 18-19).

⁸Diverging figures in J. Caro Baroja, *Los judíos...*, I, pp. 198-205; Y. Baer, *Historia de los judíos...*, II, pp. 649-650; B. Netanyahu, *Los marranos españoles...*, pp. 203-211; and A. Milhou, “La cultura cristiana...”, p. 15.

⁹R. Villa-Real, *Historia de Granada*, Granada, 1991, pp. 151-152.

¹⁰R. Villa-Real, *Historia de Granada...*, p. 166.

¹¹See H. Lapeyre, *Géographie de l’Espagne morisque*, Paris, 1959; J.-P. Le Flem, in M. Tuñón de Lara, ed., *Historia de España*, Barcelona, 1982, vol. V, pp. 95-96; A. Milhou, “La culturacristiana...”, p. 16; J. Reglá,

- Estudios sobre los moriscos*, Valencia, 1964; or J. Linz, "Five Centuries of Spanish History: Quantification and Comparison" en V. R. Lorwin & J. Price, *The Dimensions of the Past*, Yale U. P., 1972, pp. 190-192.
- ¹²Fray Marcos de Guadalajara and Pedro Aznar, quoted by R. García Cárcel, "El concepted'Espanya als segles XVI i XVII", *L'Avenç*, 100, 1987, p. 44.
- ¹³Antón del Montoro, quoted by A. Domínguez Ortiz, *Los judeoconversos...*, pp. 255-256.
- ¹⁴On the *Estatutos*, see A. Sicroff, *Les controverses des statuts de pureté de sang en Espagne du XVe au XVIIIe siècle*, Paris, 1960. Cfr. A. Domínguez Ortiz, *Los judeoconversos...*, pp. 137-172.
- ¹⁵On the *cristianos nuevos*, see A. Castro, *La realidad histórica de España* and several other studies. According to J. Linz, "Intellectual Roles...", p. 69, no more than a 10% of the 16th Century intellectuals and a 6% in the 17th came from a *converso* family.
- ¹⁶Müntzer, in J. García Mercadal, *Viajes...*, I, pp. 53-54, 85, 111-115, 149 and 171-172. Guicciardini, "Relación del viaje (1512)", in *ibid.*, I, 609-623.
- ¹⁷S. Arnoldsson, *Leyenda Negra...*, p. 31. Bataillon and Richelieu in A. Milhou, "La cultura cristiana...", pp. 12 and 14. Russians, in J. H. Billington, *The Icon and the Axe. An Interpretive History of Russian Culture*, New York, 1966, p. 70.
- ¹⁸See, for instance, A. Domínguez Ortiz, *El Antiguo Régimen: los Reyes Católicos y los Austrias*, Madrid, 1973, pp. 220-239.
- ¹⁹Quoted by J. A. Maravall, *Teatro y literatura...*, pp. 126-127 and 132-133.
- ²⁰On Suárez, see C. Valverde, "La filosofía", en *El Siglo del Quijote*, vol. XXVI of the *Historia de España Menéndez Pidal*, Madrid, 1986, pp. 103-110. On Vitoria, V. Beltrán, *Francisco de Vitoria*, Barcelona, 1939, pp. 157ff. On both, A. Dempf *La filosofía cristiana del Estado en España*, Madrid, 1961, pp. 106-159.
- ²¹See A. Morales Moya, ed., *Las bases políticas, económicas y sociales de un régimen en transformación (1759-1834)*, vol. XXX of the *Historia de España Menéndez Pidal*, Madrid, 1988, pp. 90 and 138.
- ²²J. Herrero, *Los orígenes del pensamiento reaccionario...*, pp. 91-133.
- ²³On Macanaz, see C. Martín Gaité, *El proceso de Macanaz. Historia de un empapelamiento*, Madrid, 1970. On Jansenism, R. Herr, *The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain*, Princeton U. P., 1969, pp. 398-434; J. Herrero, *Los orígenes del pensamiento reaccionario...*, pp. 71-89; F. Lafage, *L'Espagne de la contre-révolution...*, pp. 49-76.
- ²⁴On Ceballos, see J. Herrero, *Los orígenes del pensamiento...*, pp. 91-104; and J. L. Abellán, *Historia crítica del pensamiento español*, Madrid, 1984, vol. IV, pp. 151-155.
- ²⁵Hervás y Panduro (1735-1809), *Historia de la vida del hombre*, with a volumen devoted to the French Revolution, and *Las causas de la Revolución Francesa*, 2 vols. (1794). On him, J. Herrero, *Los orígenes del pensamiento...*, pp. 151-181.
- ²⁶The Amat-Villanueva-Hervás incident, in Menéndez Pelayo, *Historia de los heterodoxos españoles*, libro VI, cap. III; cfr. J. L. Abellán, *Historia crítica del pensamiento...*, IV, p. 152.
- ²⁷J.-R. Aymes, *La Guerra de España contra la Revolución Francesa (1793-1795)*, Alicante, 1991, pp. 413-19, 439-46. "Por Dios, el Rey y la Patria" in 1793, according to R. Gamba Ciudad, *La primera guerra civil de España (1821-1823)*, Madrid, 1950, p. 100.
- ²⁸J.-R. Aymes, *La Guerra de España...*, pp. 422 and 440.
- ²⁹On Fr. Diego de Cádiz, see J. Herrero, *Los orígenes del pensamiento...*, pp. 142-147; or J. L. Abellán, *Historia crítica del pensamiento...*, IV, pp. 162-165.
- ³⁰J. Herrero, *Orígenes pensamiento...*, pp. 222-223; quote of *Diario*, pp. 227-228; 1808 war as a crusade, also in J. L. Abellán, *Historia crítica pensamiento...*, IV, pp. 165ff.
- ³¹S. López, *Despertador Cristiano-Político*, Valencia, 1809, pp. 1-4, 6 and 12.
- ³²*Despertador...*, pp. 17 and 30. On this pamphlet, J. Herrero, *Orígenes pensamiento...*, pp. 251-256.
- ³³*Catecismos políticos españoles*, Madrid, 1989, pp. 17 and 19.
- ³⁴*Modernidad e Independencias...*, p. 249.
- ³⁵The marquis of Rumbiarcarácter, in Pérez Galdós' *National Episodes*, mistrusted the British for being "blind to the trae and only Church" (Cádiz, XXVIII). M. M. López' poem, in *Los afectuosos gemidos de la nación española*, Cádiz, N. Gómez, 1813 (*Vile Spaniards, infatuated with pride and seductive words of equality, freedom and - how lunatic!- nation, independence, cities, natural and imprescriptible rights...*)
- ³⁶M. Artola, *La burguesía revolucionaria...*, p. 51; and *La España de Fernando VII...*, p. 869; A. M. Moral Roncal, *Carlos V de Borbón (1788-1855)*, Madrid, 1999, pp. 113, 119, 173.

- ³⁷M. Artola, *La España de Fernando VII...*, p. 864. *El Trapense*, in P. de Montoya, *La intervención del clero vasco en las contiendas civiles (1820-23)*, San Sebastián, 1971, p. 352. Royal Junta in Navarre, in F. Lafage, *L'Espagne de la contre-révolution...*, p. 105.
- ³⁸J. A. Llanos, *Memorias poéticas, o Llantos de la Madre Patria por los efectos de la Ominosa Constitución*, Madrid, 1824, pp. 15, 19-20 and 26-27.
- ³⁹M. Artola, *La España de Fernando VII...*, p. 862.
- ⁴⁰P. C. González Cuevas, *Historia de las derechas...*, p. 77.
- ⁴¹R. Vélez (1777-1850), Capuchinfriar, published in Cadiz, during the war, *El Sol de Cádiz* (1812-13) and *Preservativo contra la Irreligión* (1812). Onhim, J. Herrero, *Orígenes pensamiento...*, pp. 264-267 and 294-300; or J. L. Abellán, *Historia crítica...*, IV, pp. 168-171.
- ⁴²M. Artola, *La España de Fernando VII...*, p. 865; previous quote, in p. 857; protests against the Ministry, pp. 922-923; objections to the police, in 1826, in F. Lafage, *L'Espagne de la contre-révolution...*, p. 111.
- ⁴³M. Artola, *La España de Fernando VII...*, p. 873.
- ⁴⁴M. Artola, *La España de Fernando VII...*, p. 884.
- ⁴⁵M. Artola, *La España de Fernando VII...*, pp. 925-926, 943 and 945. Cfr. W. Callahan, *Church, Politics and Society...*, pp. 147 y 151. Alameda, "Instituciones del Estado carlista", in R. M. Lázaro Torres, *El poder de los carlistas. Evolución y declive de un Estado, 1833-1839*, Bilbao, 1993, pp. 73 and 102.
- ⁴⁶The reference to an ethnic *patria* also guaranteed the Catholic and monarchical character of Spain, according to F. Lafage, *L'Espagne de la contre-révolution...*, pp. 105-106.
- ⁴⁷V. Garmendia, *La ideología carlista (1868-1876)*, San Sebastián, 1984; bishop of Urgel, p. 234; Muzquiz, p. 236.
- ⁴⁸"Freedom" vs "religión", in Pérez Galdós, *La campaña del Maestrazgo*, chap. VII; "¡Muera la Nación!" and "¡Vivan las caenas!" cries, in *Los Cien Mil Hijos de San Luis*, chap. XXX; "¡Viva el Rey absoluto! ¡Muera la Nación!", chap. XXXVI. *Padre Puñal*, in Baroja, quoted by P. de Montoya, *La intervención del clero vasco...*, p. 36.
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- ⁵⁰J. Donoso Cortés, *Obras Completas*, Madrid, 1946, vol. II, pp. 368, 409 y 437. Cfr. J. Álvarez Junco, "Estudio preliminar" a Juan Donoso Cortés, *Lecciones de Derecho político* [1835], Madrid, 1984.
- ⁵¹Even a Francoist author, such as F. Gutiérrez Lasanta, in *Donoso Cortés, el Profeta de la Hispanidad*, Logroño, 1953, and despite the title, interprets Donoso, above all, as an "European". On Donoso's irrationalism, rather than Romanticism, see V. Lloréns, *El romanticismo español*, Madrid, 1979, pp. 557-559.
- ⁵²J. Donoso Cortés, *Obras Completas*, 1970 ed., vol. II, p. 312; satanic theology in socialism, vol. II, pp. 597-600. Urigüen, *Orígenes y evolución de la derecha...*, p. 60.
- ⁵³*Obras Completas*, ed. 1946, vol. I, pp. 197-198.
- ⁵⁴*Obras Completas*, ed. 1970, vol. II, pp. 653, 894-895 y 910; J. T. Graham, *Donoso Cortés, Utopian Romanticist and Political Realist*, University of Missouri Press, 1974, chap. 9. On the French-Italian counter-revolutionary thinkers behind him, see J. L. Abellán, *Historia crítica del pensamiento...*, IV, p. 179.
- ⁵⁵B. Urigüen, *Orígenes y evolución de la derecha...*, p. 55.